66 Failings of North Yorkshire Council

A. Formation and Approval of the Policy

The evidence indicates that the Home to School Transport policy introduced in July 2024 was progressed at pace without the level of checks or adjustments based on feedback expected for a change of this scale and impact. Key concerns include:

Members were told at the July 2024 Full Council that there was a legal requirement to have the amended policy in place by September 2024 to affect September 2025 admissions. This was not correct. Other councils allowed more time to ensure proper scrutiny and safe implementation.

The policy was therefore rushed through without proper scrutiny, on the basis that delay "was not an option", with the timetable further compressed by the decision to proceed immediately following the 2024 General Election.

There was a failure to communicate with and consult senior school leaders ahead of implementation, despite schools being directly affected by changes to transport eligibility, admissions expectations and pupil movement patterns.

The consultation process was effectively ignored, reducing it to an expensive tick-box exercise rather than a mechanism for shaping policy.

Despite the scale of the change and the high level of concern raised by the public, members, parish councillors, MPs and educators – no social impact study was conducted. One Conservative councillor admitted in private that this was a mistake for something this scale and had that been done, the policy ‘would never have seen the light of day.’

Officers have repeatedly claimed that extended rights for low-income families were added following consultation, when in fact these are a statutory requirement and should already have been included to avoid breaching equality duties.

The climate change impact assessment considered only council-commissioned transport vehicles, not the wider impact of increased private car use. This led to misleading conclusions about environmental effects.

The initial Equality Impact Assessment (July 2024) acknowledged negative impacts on families and carers, yet the key mitigation identified — a Post-Implementation Review (PIR) scheduled for July 2025 — was delayed.

Additional implementation monitoring commitments outlined in that report were removed or deferred without explanation.

There was continued denial that the PIR timetable had slipped, even though the original schedule appears in the July 2024 Full Council minutes.

Later Equality Impact Assessments (January 2025 and December 2025) significantly reduced or removed earlier concerns. Requests for the supporting data through FOI have been repeatedly refused, limiting transparency.

Members were repeatedly told there was no alternative to removing catchment because this was the statutory position, when this does in fact represent only the minimum legal requirement, not the only available policy choice.

SEND and mainstream transport costs were mostly presented together in reporting, creating a misleading narrative about the drivers of increased transport spend.

The policy relied heavily on an unsubstantiated savings model, with repeated reference to a £4 million savings target that appeared unrealistic and unobtainable in practice.

Officers failed to draw member’s attention to the fact that over time ‘nearest school only’ costs MORE than ‘nearest or catchment’ model if all children entitled to free transport was to take that up. No modelling was done to track cost per head increases and no mention of the fact cost benefits are likely to be eroded out over time as nearest school becomes the norm.

Cost saving model failed to factor in cost for additional vehicles required to cover new routes to nearest schools. No consideration given to the fact vehicles and drivers are in short supply therefore by creating more demand the market price would be inflated, and NY would have a higher reliance on transport providers from out of county.

B. Design Flaws and Unjust Decisions

The evidence indicates that several structural design choices within the policy created avoidable complexity, inconsistency and error at the point of implementation. These issues were not incidental but arose from the way the policy framework itself was constructed and applied. Key concerns include:

The decision to measure eligibility using shortest available walked route rather than distance by road departed from established expectations and did not reflect DfE guidance in practice.

Distance measurement remained by road for low-income families, creating a two-tier measurement system within the same policy.

The Council’s “Find my nearest school” responses generate distance using walked routes only, meaning low-income families are receiving incorrect nearest-school information for eligibility purposes.

There was a failure to obtain accurate and complete school gate data before implementation, resulting in missing gates and incorrect eligibility decisions.

Routes described as the shortest available walked route do not in some cases represent a physically walkable route, for example where measurements begin from points inside properties and connect artificially to the public network.

Route maps contain unexplained start and end coordinates which do not correspond to school gates and, in some cases, do not begin at the family property.

Parents have been refused access to accurate start and end coordinate data, including where requested under SAR and EIR provisions.

Some mapped routes include sections that are not public rights of way, despite the Council’s responsibilities under the Definitive Map and Statement framework.

Some mapped routes include sections that are not safe or available to walk, including military training areas, river fords, crossing barriers on the A64, and private farms and estates.

There has been a failure to acknowledge and exclude remote routes that are impassable in winter, with officers stating that safety assessments would only be undertaken after a child had enrolled at the school. This creates a catch-22 for families in the most remote locations and fails to recognise that child safety is a shared responsibility between both the Council and parents.

Routes previously identified as unsafe have not been excluded from eligibility calculations.

Errors in mapping and route availability have not been corrected once identified, including at the point of the September 2025 mapping update.

These mapping issues have not been recognised within the appeals process, even where clearly evidenced.

Parents were not provided with mapping route data or start/end coordinate data at the point of school application, preventing them from verifying whether the identified nearest school was correct.

Missing or incorrect school gate data has not been corrected when identified.

Appeals have been refused even where missing school gate data was acknowledged, including in cases such as Tadcaster Grammar School.

There has been a consistent failure to respond to parental requests in a transparent and timely manner, resulting in delay, frustration and a breakdown in trust between affected families and the Council.

C. Communication at Launch

The evidence indicates that communication at the point of policy launch was insufficient for a change of this scale and consequence. Known risks were identified in advance, but mitigation was limited, and errors were not corrected in a timely way. Key concerns include:

The refusal to delay implementation resulted in only a 12-day window to communicate the policy change to parents applying for secondary school places in September 2024 for September 2025 entry, despite this being identified as a high-risk communication period.

No direct communication about the policy change was issued by the Council to affected parents.

Instead, a message was sent to North Yorkshire primary schools via the electronic Red Bag system, with a request that schools forward it to Year 6 parents.

This message was not marked as urgent and was not clearly labelled as a school transport policy change.

The message was not sent to primary schools outside the North Yorkshire Council area, despite those pupils also being affected.

Some primary schools within the North Yorkshire Council area did not receive the message.

The previous transport policy remained live on the Council website in a key location for approximately six months after the change, continuing to state that transport was available to catchment schools as well as the nearest school. This was only corrected after being identified by the School Transport Action Group (STAG).

References to catchment-based transport eligibility remained on two application forms until March 2025.

These communication errors were initially denied and later acknowledged, contributing to concerns about transparency.

The combination of limited communication at launch and incorrect information remaining in circulation meant that many parents selected schools without knowing the eligibility rules had changed and only discovered this later when transport was refused.

These communication failures have frequently been dismissed as irrelevant within appeals, despite their direct impact on parental decision-making.

However, at least one appeal in August 2025 was upheld and transport granted citing communication errors as the reason why, other cases with the exact same circumstances were rejected, demonstrating inconsistent treatment of similar cases.

Officers have since acknowledged communication errors and the need to improve future engagement. However, this acknowledgement does not address the position of families whose school choices were made because of incorrect or incomplete information and who continue to be denied transport.

D. Failure to Consider

The evidence indicates that several consequences of the policy were either not assessed in advance or not addressed once identified. Key concerns include:

Scenario A – Winter-impassable routes. Safety assessments deferred until after enrolment create a catch-22 for families in remote locations and prevent informed school choice.

Scenario B – Same bus, different rules. Refusal to allow free transport where the same vehicle serves neighbouring schools produces no meaningful savings and creates visible inequity, for example Richmond School and St Francis Xavier School, and Outwood Academy Ripon and Ripon Grammar School.

Scenario C – Out-of-county nearest schools. Families in areas such as North Richmondshire and Appleton Roebuck face admissions uncertainty where nearest schools lie outside the county and are oversubscribed, creating a transport-dependent allocation lottery and potential additional cost pressures for the Council.

A clause introduced in a private meeting on 22 May 2025 permits the withdrawal of paid transport passes where routes are cancelled or vehicles downsized to achieve savings. This creates uncertainty for families and risks forcing school changes mid-journey through education. This decision did not go to Scrutiny and no impact assessment was done.

Smaller secondary schools such as Settle School and Boroughbridge High School, along with several primary schools already managing low pupil numbers, are experiencing additional pressure and an unexpected annual financial hit because of the policy changes. These impacts were not referenced in the February 2026 School Statistics Reports presented to Area Committees, and requests from members and the public for supporting information have been refused.

No assessment has been published examining the impact of transport changes on sixth-form access or progression to further and higher education.

Taxi transport arrangements now involve vehicles travelling long distances across the county twice daily, including journeys that cross county boundaries. No assessment has been presented examining cost implications, environmental impact, the effect on taxi availability for the night-time economy, or increased private car journeys. Requests for vehicle-type cost data have been consistently refused.

Higher accident risks at the school gate created by increased number of private vehicles dropping off and picking up was not factored (e.g. Tadcaster - already identified as unsafe for number of vehicles currently doing it and new policy has already started to increase this significantly.)

Failure to consider economic impact on rural villages and the wider economy (ie. loss of work force, relocation of families away from villages, impact on house prices in emerging ‘school transport desert’ areas.

Unlike most other councils, no flexibility given to families who already had one siblings at catchment schools, even when the alternative nearest school was out of area and had different term times.

E. Mis-management of H2ST Appeals

The evidence indicates that the operation of the Home to School Transport appeals process has not provided families with confidence that decisions are being reviewed consistently, transparently or on a secure evidential basis. Key concerns include:

There was a failure to schedule appeals promptly in Summer 2025, meaning many hearings took place after the start of the school term, limiting their practical value to families making school transport decisions.

Changes to the appeals process were introduced in August 2025, including new restrictions on representatives, accompanied by inaccurate explanations for the reasons behind them, including statements made to the Local Government Ombudsman.

New restrictions introduced in August 2025 stated that route maps would only be provided at the point of a Stage 2 appeal. This gives parents very limited time to prepare their case and removes their ability to decide whether to proceed with an appeal based on suspected distance measurement errors.

There has been a failure to explain why appeal success rates appear significantly lower than those reported by comparable local authorities.

There appears to be an absence of consistent legal support within the appeals process, increasing the risk that decisions are not always made on firm or defensible legal grounds.

Evidence from families indicates inconsistent decision-making between apparently similar cases.

Decisions continue to be frequently not explained in sufficient detail to understand the basis for the decision (as legally required). Requests from parents for clarification behind a decision have mostly gone unanswered.

Parents have been informed that case law is not permitted to be considered and that precedent does not apply within appeals.

There has been resistance to sharing detailed appeal panel minutes with parents when requested. We are unclear as to whether panel members sign off these minutes or whether they are given access to the decision response that are emailed to parents.

Requests for re-hearings where new material evidence has emerged have been refused and parents referred to the ombudsman.

F. Overall Process Conclusion

The poor implementation of the 2024 Home to School Transport policy by North Yorkshire Council has resulted in a breakdown of relations between the public and the local authority on this issue.

The combination of compressed timetable, poor communication, failure to engage with key stakeholders, and a refusal to adjust course once risks and impacts became clear, sit at the root of the problem.

They explain why the consequences of the school transport changes have been so significant for families and communities, and why reputational damage to the Council has been done.

The ever-increasing bank of evidence indicates that because of the way the policy was shaped and implemented, North Yorkshire Council now has a Home to School Transport policy in place that many parents continue to experience as not fit for purpose.

The School Transport Action Group will continue to stand with parents, teachers and rural communities in the fight to get this damaging policy changed.

Prepared by: The School Transport Action Group (S.T.A.G)